Introduction
British troops first deployed to Bosnia in November 1992 in the Operation Grapple series of peacekeeping operations, carried out under UN mandate. Intense US diplomacy during September 1995 resulted in a negotiated ceasefire. On 15 December 1995 the Day ton peace agreement was signed in Paris by representatives from all the warring factions in the Former Yugoslavian Republic of BosniaHerzegovina. On D-Day, 20 December 1995, there was a formal transfer of peacekeeping authority from the UN to NATO. This date marked the start of Operation Resolute.
Britain undertook to play a major part in the new peace process and to contribute in excess of 10,000 troops to the NATO-led peace implementation force, to be known as IFOR. The majority of these British troops were to be deployed within the area of operations (AO) of the Multinational Division Southwest, with its headquarters at Gomji Vakuf. The logistic support elements of the division were concentrated in the divisional rear area in and around Split. In addition, Britain was the "framework nation" in the theatre headquarters locations at Sarajevo and Kiseljak of the ACE (Allied Command Europe) Rapid Reaction Corps, or ARRC. There were thus three distinct British troop populations at all stages of Operation Resolute, each population experiencing different health hazards. Figure 1 shows the principal British locations during the early stages of the operation.
British 
Health Data/ram Operation Resolute
The same HQ ARRC daily return was used to collect limited data on hospital admissions, military fatalities, the • treatment of non-military personnel, and resource utilisation.
The return was submitted nightly to the medical cell at the divisional headquarters at Gornji Vakuf, normally through radio link or fax. Analysis was carried out with the Army's SLIM for Windows (SFW) package, which is based on a modified Windows for Workgroups 3.11 platform, using MS Office Professional 4.3 automation software (I). SFW is currently the only IT package which is approved for use on British military operations.
100% coverage of all British medical facilities in theatre was achieved from D-Day onwards. Any gaps in sickness data reporting were followed up by personal phone call, fax, radio message, letter or signal. PTecise population data were obtained from central staff branches, and were re-calculated daily. From the start of the operation, therefore, numerator data were complete and denominators were correct to the nearest man in theatre.
Results
Between Weeks 1-19 of Operation Resolute 17,054 primary care consultations took place in British medical facilities. The breakdown of these consultations according to the three principal military groupings where they occurred is given in Table 1. Table 2 shows the relative populations of these three groupings as they changed over time.
In all, there were 11,472 consultations for disease (67% of the total) during this early phase of Operation Resolute. There were 5568 consultations for non-battle injury (32% 0 the total) and only 14 primary care consultations due to battle injury. Prior to the start of Operation Resolute, HQ ARRC had issued a series of "medical planning predictions" to commanders in the troop contributing nations of IFOR. These planning predictions stated that 1.35% of the force would seek medical assistance on account of disease each day, and 0.05% on account of non-battle injury. Figure 2 converts these predictions to rates per 1000 force strength. As the chart shows, the observed daily consultation rate for disease was close to the predicted rate, and fluctuated between a range of 7.3 daily disease consultation per 1000 strength (Week 14) and 19.2 daily disease consultations per 1000 strength (Week 3). The non-battle injury prediction, however, seriously underestimated the actual rate of NBI in 
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:>,0. British troops in theatre. This fluctuated between 2.9 daily NBI consultations per 1000 force strength (Week 5) and 5.9 daily NB! consultations per 1000 strength (Week 11). As is shown in Figure 2 , the disease prediction proved to be surprisingly accurate, but the non-battle injury prediction underestimated the actual rate of NB! by a factor of around ten. Figures 3 and 4 look more closely at morbidity associated with operational injuries. Despite the great volume of road movement which occurred during the early months of Operation Resolute, there were no RTA fatalities. However, injury due to RTAs ran at a high level in the early weeks of Operation Resolute on account of treacherous weather conditions, poor roads, and inexperienced and over-tired drivers. There is some evidence from the data that after the troop population "surge" of the first few weeks, drivers learned to manage their vehicles more safely and injuries declined.
Occupational injury, on the other hand, continued at a more constant level throughout the first 19 weeks of Operation Resolute, as is shown in Figure 4 . Figure 5 plots consultations for dental disorders against time. Dental disease was a significant primary care burden during Weeks 1-19 of Operation Resolute, notwithstanding the fact that troops notionally arrived in theatre dentally fit. The disproportionately high dental caseload which appears to have fallen to the divisional AO probably reflects easier access there to dental facilities, rather than a higher level of dental disease as such. 
Discussion
The Defence Analytical Services Agency (DASA) publishes an annual compilation of every admission to a , military hospital that results in a "bedded sickness episode" lasting 48 hours or more (5). In addition there exist several published accounts of disease outbreaks or other extraordinary medical occurrences in recent military campaigns (6, 7, 8) . However there is a dearth of published data relating to routine primary health care events during recent military operations, and Winfield's paper (9) is possibly unique in this respect. This lack of reliable data relating to low-level military morbidity is all the more surprising given the fact that in the planning of any military operation it is essential to be able to predict accurately the likely level of daily force attrition that will result from routine sickness. These planning predictions are an important determinant of the number of troops that will be mobilised. They also dictate the overall number, and the skill mix in that number, of uniformed healthcare personnel who will be required to support the operation. The fact that the ARRC planning predictions for routine NB! occurrences to be expected in Bosnia was incorrect by a factor of ten strongly suggests that these predictions were based on flawed or inappropriate data compiled from past operations. Pre-deployment health intelligence seems not to have anticipated specific injury hazards such as dog bites and sports injuries, which were common during Operation Resolute and contributed to the high injury caseload. These are analysed elsewhere (10, 11) .
During the prosecution phase of a military campaign no less than in the planning phase, commanders require timely and accurate intelligence on routine sickness. This intelligence should be refreshed at least daily. The requirement is especially urgent given that military operations today are conducted under the spotlight of the news media (12). Today's press expect unrestricted access to almost every area of a theatre of war, and are swift to proclaim any real or imagined threat to the health of British troops. This phenomenon has been observed already during Operation Resolute (13, 14) .
The success of this HQ ARRC data collection system shows that it is possible to devise and to implement a simple daily surveillance programme of the health of deployed troops, which is capable of providing reliable feedback within hours to commanders and to medical personnel on the ground, and to serve also as a useful planning tool for future operations. Factors which in past operations have contributed to the low visibility of primary care data include poor initial record-keeping, incomplete data capture due to the "fog of war", local difficulties with communications, shifting denominator populations, and lack of epidemiological expertise in headquarters staffs. None of these excuses should be tolerated any longer.
